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Aaron Parecki

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Thursday, March 2, 2023

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bicycle
35 min
 
7.5 miles
 
bicycle
  • 11:32pm
    Asleep
    5:31am
    Awake
    5h 59m
    Slept
    22m
    Awake for
    Portland, Oregon, USA • 39°F
    Thu, Mar 2, 2023 5:31am -08:00
  • The Great Gaslighting of the JavaScript Era | The Spicy Web (www.spicyweb.dev)
    Thu, Mar 2, 2023 6:30am -08:00 #web #react #javascript
  • Brian O'Connor https://twitter.com/BrianFOConnor
    2) Write your brand's story

    This story is about the customer.

    Make them the hero, their problem is the "villain" and you are the guide who will give them a plan to overcome their pain.

    Here are the 7 steps you need to build your story:
    Portland, Oregon • 39°F
    Wed, Mar 1, 2023 1:35pm +00:00 (liked on Thu, Mar 2, 2023 7:54am -08:00)
  • Charlotte Brandhorst-Satzkorn https://inuh.net/@catzkorn   •   Mar 2

    Ever wanted to use your own choice of OIDC IdP with @tailscale? I'm looking for private alpha testers - new and existing users welcome. DM me!

    Aaron Parecki
    I would love to check this out actually, I'm working on some documentation to help companies like Tailscale adopt features exactly like this!

    I don't have a way to DM you on mastodon but you can email me! https://aaronparecki.com/contact/
    Portland, Oregon • 39°F
    Thu, Mar 2, 2023 9:40am -08:00
  • Aaron Parecki
    another day, another account takeover caused by an open redirector and the OAuth Implicit flow 🫠

    https://salt.security/blog/traveling-with-oauth-account-takeover-on-booking-com
    Portland, Oregon • 40°F
    14 likes 4 reposts 1 reply
    Thu, Mar 2, 2023 10:16am -08:00 #oauth #security
  • Brandon Trebitowski https://brandontreb.com   •   Mar 2

    Could using PKCE fix this issue?

    Aaron Parecki
    Yep! This is exactly the kind of thing PKCE prevents! With PKCE, even if the open redirect were in place, the attacker wouldn't have been able to do anything with the stolen authorization code.

    Although now I'm thinking this through and if the open redirects are really open enough, you could probably still pull something off even while using PKCE.
    Portland, Oregon • 42°F
    1 reply
    Thu, Mar 2, 2023 4:03pm -08:00
  • Brandon Trebitowski https://brandontreb.com   •   Mar 3

    True, but it would be tricky.

    Wouldn’t the attacker have find a way to extract the code_verifier from local storage and pass it along with the hijacked redirect?

    They would have to somehow have the ability to write custom js code on the path they are redirecting to. I guess this is possible on sites that don’t sanitize user inputs.

    Aaron Parecki
    I was thinking the attacker makes up their *own* `code_verifier` and injects that into the first open redirect
    Portland, Oregon • 42°F
    1 reply
    Thu, Mar 2, 2023 4:16pm -08:00
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Hi, I'm Aaron Parecki, Director of Identity Standards at Okta, and co-founder of IndieWebCamp. I maintain oauth.net, write and consult about OAuth, and participate in the OAuth Working Group at the IETF. I also help people learn about video production and livestreaming. (detailed bio)

I've been tracking my location since 2008 and I wrote 100 songs in 100 days. I've spoken at conferences around the world about owning your data, OAuth, quantified self, and explained why R is a vowel. Read more.

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